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WHEN STATES MEDIATE 
Molly M. Melin* 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of mediation for conflict resolution is not a new 
process. The first recorded mediation efforts occurred in 209 B.C., 
when Greek city-states helped the Aetolian League and Macedonia 
produce a truce in the first Macedonian war. Since then, mediation 
has been increasingly employed as a tool for peacefully resolving 
conflict.1 The International Conflict Management Dataset2 reports 
1334 mediation attempts by states in 333 interstate and civil conflicts 
since World War II, with more than half of the mediation efforts 
occurring since the end of the Cold War.3 States represent the most 
                                                 
* Molly M. Melin, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Loyola 
University Chicago. 
1 The benefits of successful mediation are widespread. Consider the case 
of the Northern Irish “Troubles.” Beginning with the Good Friday Accords and 
continuing with the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in mediating 
interpersonal disputes, the relative peace in Northern Ireland today is a testament 
to the power of a well-orchestrated and sustained mediation effort. 
2 JACOB BERCOVITCH, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
DATASET: OFFICIAL CODEBOOK FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT DATASET (1999); J. MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL F. DIEHL, 
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 31 (2012). The International Conflict Management 
dataset was compiled by Professor Jacob Bercovitch in the late 1990s and focuses 
on the mechanisms used in international conflict management. JACOB 
BERCOVITCH, VICTOR KREMENYUK & I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, THE SAGE 
HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 570 (2008) (defining international conflict 
as “organised and continuous militarized conflict, or a demonstration of intention 
to use military force involving at least one state.”). 
3   BERCOVITCH, supra note 2, at 31. 
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common type of political actor willing to serve as a mediator in 
international dispute resolution—a category often referred to as 
“state-led” mediation. Not all states, however, volunteer to serve as 
mediators and not all disputes receive mediator assistance. This essay 
examines the drivers of such choices and suggests factors that 
policymakers should consider when assessing whether to engage in 
state-led mediation. 
An understanding of these factors will help policymakers 
generate expectations about which states are likely to have an interest 
in mediating conflicts (and can be successfully encouraged to do so), 
and which disputants are likely to accept state-led mediation offers 
(thereby avoiding the loss of face associated with rejection). The 
objective of this exercise is to assist the policymaker in identifying the 
circumstances where state-led mediation will have a positive and 
permanent influence on long-term peace. Section I of the paper 
describes the role states play in the mediation process, both in terms 
of the broader spectrum of mediators and in terms of involvement 
frequency. Section II discusses the conditions that facilitate state-led 
mediation efforts, and the conclusion offers recommendations for 
achieving more effective state-led mediation efforts. 
I. THE STATE AS PEACEMAKER—A STRATEGIC CHOICE? 
There are four main types of mediators: international 
organizations (e.g., the United Nations), regional governmental 
organizations (e.g., the Arab League), individuals (e.g., former United 
States President Jimmy Carter), and states (e.g., New Zealand). States 
are the most common mediator and the focus of this paper.4 
Mediation works differently across mediator types. Of particular 
                                                 
4 For work on mediation involving regional organizations, see generally 
Scott Sigmund Gartner, Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation and Civil War 
Agreement Durability, 73 J. POL. 380 (2011). For work on international organizations, 
see generally Holley E. Hansen, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Stephen C. Nemeth, 
IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy, 52 
J.CONFLICT RESOL. 295 (2008); Megan Shannon, Preventing War and Providing the 
Peace? International Organizations and the Management of Territorial Disputes, 26 CONFLICT 
MGMT. & PEACE SCI.144 (2009). 
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note, the motivations of states for offering mediation assistance differ 
from those of the other actors.5 
States carefully consider when and where they mediate, and 
often consider the strategic benefits when deciding whether to take 
on the mediator role. Potential gains include establishing a reputation 
as a peacemaker (as have Norway and Sweden) and enhancing the 
state’s influence in the dispute’s outcome, either by changing an 
unfavorable situation or maintaining a favorable status quo. 
Understandably, states are more likely to take up the role of mediator 
if it will expand their influence, resources, and power. Figure 1 
depicts the number of conflicts and state-led mediation efforts over 
time.6 While the number of mediation efforts per year closely follows 
the number of disputes per year, the two lines never intersect—a 
characteristic I explore further below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 For example, international organizations often include peacemaking as 
a part of their charter (e.g., the African Union and Organization of American 
States), but frequently must overcome political struggles between members before 
mediation can occur. Conversely, state mediators often struggle to establish 
impartibility given their significant stake in the outcome of the mediation efforts. 
States also have more policy instruments at their disposal than international 
organizations, allowing for greater variation in reactions to external conflict—most 
notably, joining the conflict in support of one side, an unlikely occurrence when an 
international organization leads mediation. 
6 BERCOVITCH, supra note 2, at 31. 
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Figure 1. The Occurrence of Disputes and State-Led Mediation 
Efforts, 1945-1999 
 
The figure also contains information about state-led 
mediation decisions. There are at least two possible ways to explain 
mediation occurrence. First, it is possible to think of states as a 
population of mediators that indiscriminately mediate any disputes 
that arise. Although this description may seem extreme, it is not far 
from popular beliefs about the obligations of the Great Powers. The 
global community often views states with large capabilities as being 
obligated to respond to instances of extreme violence. The second 
explanation sees mediation as resulting from strategic calculations. In 
this case, states do not indiscriminately mediate, but rather consider 
the costs and benefits before agreeing to do so. 
If the former proposition is correct, the supply of mediators 
would remain relatively constant. And if the supply of mediators was 
constant, we would observe stability in the number of mediation 
efforts. Years with many conflicts would likely experience mediator 
supply problems with a large gap between the number of disputes 
and the number of mediation efforts. In years with fewer disputes, 
most disputes would be mediated. The data, however, does not seem 
to support the proposition that Great Powers feel any significant 
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obligations to mediate by virtue of their leadership role in the global 
community. 
Indeed, a further unpacking of the data seems to endorse the 
latter view—that a state’s decision to serve as a mediator is the result 
of strategic calculations. Figure 2 graphs the gap between the two 
lines from Figure 1, showing the variation in the number of disputes 
that go without state-led mediation. There is no year for which all 
disputes are mediated by states (no matter how few disputes are 
observed), and there is variation in the percent mediated—both 
provide evidence that states make strategic mediation choices. 
Figure 2. The Gap Between the Number of Conflicts and 
Mediation Occurrence, 1945-1999 
 
II. IDENTIFYING THE OPTIMAL CONDITIONS FOR STATE-LED 
MEDIATION 
Unlike sanctions or military intervention, a prerequisite to the 
occurrence of mediation is the acceptability of mediation to all 
involved parties. An often cited definition of mediation highlights 
this characteristic, describing mediation as “a reactive process of 
conflict management whereby parties seek the assistance of, or accept 
an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change 
their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without 
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resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law.”7 
Generally, political or economic ties between a potential mediator 
and the disputants increase the occurrence of mediation.8 These ties 
generate state interest in conflict resolution, and often translate into 
leverage at the negotiating table.9 The remainder of this essay 
explores the conditions that increase mediation occurrence (both in 
terms of state willingness to mediate and in terms of belligerents 
accepting state-led mediation) and success, as summarized in Table 1. 
  
                                                 
7 Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation: 
Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 11, 13 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996). 
8 Ties that affect mediation offers and acceptance include trading 
partnerships, alliances, physical proximity, and even former colonial ties. For an in-
depth analysis of how ties affect mediation and conflict management behavior, see 
generally Molly M. Melin, The Impact of State Relationship on If, When, and How Conflict 
Management Occurs, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 691 (2011). 
9 For more on mediator leverage see Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool 
for the Job: Mediator Leverage and Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 
(2013). 
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Table 1. Summary of Factors that Affect Mediation 
Explanatory  
Variable 
Effect on Mediation 
Occurrence 
Effect on Mediation 
Outcome 
 
Regime Type 
 
Democracy increases 
mediation occurrence 
 
Democracy increases 
mediation success 
 
Third-Party 
Capabilities 
Capable mediators 
increase mediation 
occurrence 
 
Capable mediators 
increase mediation 
success 
Conflict Costs Violence increases 
mediation occurrence 
Violence increases 
mediation success 
 
Rivalries & 
Reoccurring Conflict 
Rivalries & reoccurrence 
increases mediation 
occurrence 
 
not observed 
 
Mediation History Previous mediation 
increases mediation 
occurrence 
 
not observed 
 
Conflict Stalemate Stalemate increases 
mediation occurrence 
 
not observed 
 
Conflict Nature International conflicts 
increase mediation 
occurrence 
not observed 
 
 
A. Regime Type 
Regime type plays an important role in the frequency and 
likely success of mediation. Regime type, or form of government, can 
encourage mediation and its success at several levels. Mediation and 
accepting offers of mediation are more likely when democracies are 
involved, as these states are accustomed to third-party involvement in 
conflict and garner other states’ trust, making them a more attractive 
option for conflict resolution.10 Democratic third parties are more 
                                                 
10 Mark J.C. Crescenzi, Kelly M. Kadera, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & 
Clayton L. Thyne, A Supply Side Theory of Mediation, 55 INT’L STUD. Q. 1069, 1084-
85 (2011). 
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likely to be accepted as mediators, democratic disputants are more 
likely to accept mediation, and a democratic international community 
increases mediation use. Democratic disputants are more accepting of 
mediation because their populace is accustomed to third-party 
involvement in domestic conflicts, thus lowering the political costs of 
mediation acceptance.11 A strong democratic community globally 
encourages even non-democracies to adopt the behavior of 
democracies, such as employing third-party resolution, which 
increases the use of mediation.12 A shared democratic culture 
between disputants and the mediator is more likely to generate an 
agreement, as democracies employ negotiation and compromise in 
disputes with other democracies but distrust the intentions of non-
democratic states and are less willing to rely on techniques of 
peaceful conflict resolution in those conflicts.13 Mediation is therefore 
best encouraged when democracies are involved as disputants and 
mediators. An apt illustration of this principle in action was Turkey’s 
willingness to work with British and American mediators following 
the 2010 Gaza-bound flotilla incident. As democratic norms continue 
to spread, state-led mediation will be increasingly employed to resolve 
disputes. 
B. Third-Party Capabilities 
States (or third parties) with material strength and diplomatic 
prowess are likely to be accepted and successful as mediators because 
these actors have access to resources and negotiating experience that 
makes them attractive as mediators and able to create and sustain 
peace. Before a state can act, however, it must have the capabilities 
necessary to be effective as a mediator.14 Mediation is therefore more 
likely when capable third parties have interests in involvement, as 
these actors have the ability to be involved. While capable third 
parties are certainly not always successful (consider Kofi Annan’s 
                                                 
11 James A. Wall Jr., John B. Stark & Rhetta L. Standifer, Mediation: A 
Current Review and Theory Development, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 370, 372-3 (2001). 
12 See generally Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, A Kantian System? Democracy and 
Third-Party Conflict Resolution, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 749 (2002). 
13 Russell J. Leng & Patrick M. Regan, Social and Political Cultural Effects on 
the Outcomes of Mediation in Militarized Interstate Disputes, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 431, 435 
(2003). 
14 Melin, supra note 8, at 706. 
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efforts in Syria), their capabilities and reputation mean they are likely 
to be deemed “acceptable” to the disputants.15 Mediators with 
material capabilities can incentivize agreements by using the 
proverbial carrot and stick to increase an agreement’s appeal or 
threaten failed compliance.16 For example, the Great Powers are 
often actively involved in conflict management, as was the case with 
European and Chinese involvement in Darfur. In selecting third 
parties with the assets necessary to create and enforce peace, 
policymakers can encourage mediation and its success. 
C. Conflict Costs 
The more costly a conflict is in terms of violence, the more 
likely it is to be “ripe” for state-led mediation.17 The increased 
international pressure and the disputants’ cost-benefit calculus create 
an appealing climate for state-led mediation efforts. Costly conflicts 
generally attract international interest. The international spotlight 
offers a state mediator the opportunity to gain in terms of reputation 
and influence. For example, New Zealand benefited from an 
enhanced regional role after successfully mediating the Bougainville 
conflict,18 as did Switzerland in bringing peace between the Algerian 
independence movement and the French government.19 Disputants 
also are more likely to accept mediation offers as the cost of conflict 
increases because increasing costs impact the disputants’ assessment 
                                                 
15 For work on the challenges of mediation in Syria, see J. Michael Greig, 
Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN 
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013).   
16 Kyle C. Beardsley et al., Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes, 50 J. 
CONFLICT RES. 58, 83 (2006). 
17 See generally I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT 
AND INTERVENTION IN AFRICA (1985). 
18 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil War Peacemaking, in PEACE AND 
CONFLICT 2012: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELF-
DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY 71, 78 (J. Joseph Hewitt et al. 
eds., 2012). See generally REBECCA ADAMS, PEACE ON BOUGAINVILLE: TRUCE 
MONITORING GROUP (2001); BOUGAINVILLE BEFORE THE CONFLICT (Anthony J. 
Regan & Helga M. Griffin eds., 2005); MONICA WEHNER & DONALD DENOON, 
WITHOUT A GUN: AUSTRALIANS’ EXPERIENCES MONITORING PEACE IN 
BOUGAINVILLE, 1997-2001, 43-48 (2001). 
19 See generally JOHN RUEDY, MODERN ALGERIA: THE ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATION (2005). 
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of whether continued death, destruction and expenditures are worth 
achieving their initial objective. Furthermore, state mediators can 
expect fewer actions will be required to resolve costly conflicts, given 
the high cost of continued conflict.20 
Increased costs also increase mediation success rates, as state 
party mediators can provide domestic political cover and enable 
leaders to agree to otherwise unacceptable terms.21 This was the case 
in Sinai (1974), El Salvador (1988), and Mozambique (1992). In 
highlighting the low costs and potential benefits of state-led 
mediation, policymakers can encourage state actors to offer and 
accept mediation. 
D. Rivalries and Reoccurring Conflict 
States may be more likely to accept mediation offers when 
the disputants are strategic rivals or view each other as threatening 
competitors.22 Such conflicts tend to be recurring, and especially 
destabilizing and violent—not only to the disputants but to third-
party state actors either located in the region or with other strong 
relationships to the disputants. These rivalries also tend to gain 
greater international attention. On first blush, these characteristics 
may make an offer to mediate unappealing to a state actor. 
Policymakers, however, should take care to note the considerable 
potential benefits of accepting the offer: the state party’s interest in 
building its reputation and in avoiding the costs associated with a 
regionally destabilizing, violent and drawn-out conflict. Said another 
way, although there is some risk in taking on the mediator role in 
such circumstances, the risks of declining such an invitation may be 
even greater. The illustrations for this factor show both sides of the 
                                                 
20 Lesley G. Terris & Zeev Maoz, Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test, 
42 J. PEACE RES. 563, 579-80 (2005) (arguing “the greater the versatility of the 
conflict, (1) the more likely are disputants to seek mediation, (2) the more likely are 
outside parties to mediate, and (3) the more intrusive the mediation strategies 
employed.”). 
21 Kyle Beardsley, Pain, Pressure and Political Cover: Explaining Mediation 
Incidence, 47 J. PEACE RES. 395, 404 (2010). 
22 Jacob Bercovitch & Paul F. Diehl, Conflict Management of Enduring 
Rivalries: The Frequency, Timing, and Short-Term Impact of Mediation, 22 INT’L 
INTERACTIONS 299, 316 (1997). 
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calculation. While President Jimmy Carter’s efforts between Egypt 
and Israel produced the still-intact Camp David Accords, mediation 
efforts between India and Pakistan and on the Korean Peninsula 
have been less successful. 
E. Mediation History 
States are more likely to agree to serve as mediators, and the 
mediation is more likely to be successful, when the disputants and the 
state have previously engaged in mediation. These prior mediation 
experiences, or mediation history, establish rapport and signal a 
commitment to peaceful conflict management. Mediation efforts are 
not isolated events. Each instance creates a mediation history of the 
state’s experience as a mediator and the disputants’ experiences in 
working with mediators. In this broader process, previous mediation 
encourages future efforts and success.23 Previous disputant 
experiences with mediation signals a disputant’s willingness to work 
with an outsider and encourages mediation offers by states. For 
example, mediation was employed repeatedly in Yugoslavia, because 
the parties had signaled they were willing to meet and negotiate, and 
the mediator established trust and rapport with the belligerents. A 
state’s mediation experience can signal to disputants the mediator’s 
ability, preferred methods, resourcefulness, and objectives.24 To be 
effective, the state mediator must be perceived as having access to 
suitable techniques for encouraging bargaining, and as having 
sufficient authority and experience to be able to utilize them. 
Consider Sweden and Norway’s reputation as purveyors of peace 
based on their history of mediation successes. Policymakers can 
encourage mediation by involving experienced third-party state 
mediators, especially when the disputants have exhibited openness to 
mediation. 
                                                 
23 J. Michael Greig, Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?, 49 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 249, 255 (2005). 
24 Oliver Richmond, Devious Objectives and the Disputants’ View of 
International Mediation: A Theoretical Framework, 35 J. PEACE RES. 707, 713 (1998). 
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F. Conflict Stalemate 
Disputants sensing a conflict stalemate or seeing the 
improbability of winning are likely to accept state-led mediation as it 
offers a viable alternative to continued conflict. “When parties find 
themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to 
victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not 
necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons), they seek a way 
out.”25 Disputants that have reached a hurting stalemate are “ripe” 
for mediation, since they cannot envision a successful outcome or an 
end to unbearable costs if they continue current strategies. Mediation 
offers a “way out” of an increasingly costly conflict. Henry Kissinger 
(under U.S. President Nixon) highlighted the notion of a stalemate in 
the Sinai withdrawal negotiations,26 as did Chester Crocker (under 
U.S. President Reagan) in Angola.27 Similarly, policymakers can 
encourage disputants to accept mediation by highlighting the 
presence of a stalemate and the futility of further escalation. 
G. Nature of the Conflict 
The international or domestic nature of the conflict has 
important implications for the effectiveness of the mediation effort 
as the cost of involving mediators varies between civil and 
international wars. Mediation is less likely in civil wars as it transfers 
legitimacy to the non-state actor and can hinder state sovereignty. In 
effect this means the political costs associated with accepting 
international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars.28 
States therefore only accept mediation in the most serious civil 
                                                 
25 I. William Zartman, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 225, 228 (Daniel 
Druckman & Paul C. Stern eds., 2000). 
26 See Briefing by Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger on Sinai Agreement: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 94th Cong. 5 (1975). 
27 See Angola: Options for American Foreign Policy: Hearing Before the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong. 3-6 (1986). 
28 Molly M. Melin & Isak Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting 
Mediation in International and Civil Wars, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 249, 254 (2009). 
For work on civil wars and the role of veto players, see David E. Cunningham, Who 
Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and Peace Processes in Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & 
INT’L AFF. 38 (2013).  
 2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:1 
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disputes, or when the benefits of peace outweigh the costs of 
legitimizing an opponent. For example, Swedish opposition leader 
Olof Palme was immediately recognized as a mediator in the war 
between Iran and Iraq, but the Sri Lankan government took 17 years 
to allow outside involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE). Given this fear of legitimizing opponents, third-party 
mediation offers are more likely to be accepted in international 
conflicts. States seeking to mediate civil conflicts will need to 
highlight other incentives, such as potential costs, before mediation is 
accepted. 
CONCLUSION 
State mediators can have a significant impact on the creation 
of a stable and sustainable peace. However, states should be selective 
in deciding when and where to mediate—as such, the policymakers 
tasked with this portfolio should be cognizant of the optimal 
circumstances for state-led mediation. Threshold considerations 
include the characteristics of the state, the nature and characteristics 
of the conflict, and the characteristics of the disputants. The ideal 
state mediator will have prior mediation experience, democratic 
governance structures and access to the resources necessary to 
enforce agreements. Democratic third parties and disputants are 
more likely to agree to mediation and to generate an agreement. 
Experienced mediators are more likely to be accepted, as are those 
with greater capabilities and resources. Mediators that lack resources 
and diplomatic experience and those from non-democracies are less 
likely to be accepted or generate lasting peace. While policymakers 
have less ability to influence the conflict characteristics, they can 
encourage mediation by highlighting the presence of a stalemate, the 
potential for escalation, and the costly nature of the conflict. By 
carefully considering the appropriateness of mediation and 
highlighting its benefits, states and disputants are more likely to 
employ mediation as a conflict management tool for crafting a lasting 
peace. 
 
